2025 Toyota Camry Hybrid: What got you here, won't get you there

Every quarter at BCG, the Houston office “Green Team” sends out a newsletter with a media spotlight section, which I occasionally write. This is a copy of that section.


This week, Toyota revealed its newest iteration of the Toyota Camry. It's a product that nearly everyone has interacted with at some point - a family car growing up, the car that seemingly every Uber driver uses. The Camry is not known for getting your heart to race. Its design is not going to wow anyone who sees a dozen every commute. It is the vanilla ice cream of sedans - reliable, dependable, a solid choice that isn't as polarized as, say, mint chocolate chip. It is also the best-selling passenger car (i.e., sedan) in the US, and has been for 22 straight years. Toyota has sold over 3.6 million from 2013-2022 in the US, many of which will remain on the road for today's kindergarteners to graduate college.

The new Camry will be hybrid only - from the most barebones version to the top-of-the-line trim, the only option for moving the wheels forward is a hybrid system. Today's Camry Hybrid gets 46-52 MPG versus the non-hybrid's 25-32, a 60-80% increase. Multiply that sort of gain by hundreds of thousands of units sold a year, and you're left with a highly sizeable reduction in fuel consumption and emissions. That's a win, right? Not quite.

There's an old adage that goes "what got you here, won't get you there". If you're aiming for a zero-emissions future, you need to stop adding durable, polluting assets far before then. I had this exact same conversation with a client this week, though this time it was about gas-driven vs. electric-driven compressors in the Permian. The client wants their operations to be ~90% electrified in the Permian by 2050, which would imply that gas compressors (which have a 25 year life) can't be deployed after 2025 unless you're willing to fork over the cash for retrofits. Along those lines, this is the importance of not chasing early wins that ultimately lock you into a path of emissions reduction. The harder, but ultimately optimal path is to zoom out, figure out how to get to 0 emissions, and pursue that path. That applies to cars, oil and gas, and any other industry has happens to have a carbon footprint.

Takeaways from Confronting Climate Gridlock

Every quarter at BCG, the Houston office “Green Team” sends out a newsletter with a media spotlight section, which I occasionally write. This is a copy of that section.


There's a lot of content out there on climate change and decarbonization, but I'd like to share a couple amazing slides from a presentation given at a recent-ish UT Energy Symposium lecture (the YouTube recording is available at https://energy.utexas.edu/events/173, and slides are at https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/Daniel%20Cohan%20UTES%2020220420.pdf).

The first two are around the historic pessimism of forecasters when it comes to the speed at which we're cleaning up the power grid. The two charts below show how the EIA forecasts have evolved over the course of the millennium to adapt to the rapid decline of coal in the US power grid (driven mostly by subpar economics compared to renewables and natural gas), and the rapid growth of solar on the US power grid (wind shows a fairly similar story, though it began taking off about a decade before solar did). Pretty much everyone got it wrong! A few years back, I had looked at the different forecasts made by the energy supermajors, different government agencies, and even folks like MBB. They were all universally way off - predicting the future is hard.

No one expected the costs for wind and solar to come down at an exponential rate as fast as they did - Lazard runs a great study each year showing the decline of the cost of wind and solar over time. The decline in cost is dramatic (solar is a tenth as expensive today as it was in 2009; wind is a quarter), and cost reductions have been best modeled by learning curves (another one of BCG's famous frameworks!) - basically, every time we double the amount of deployed wind/solar in the world, costs tend to decline by X%:

All of this leads into the last slide - perhaps the single-best view of how to decarbonize the global economy. Each box represents some use case for energy, like air travel, lighting, refrigeration, etc. Some of those run primarily off of electricity today (e.g. refrigeration) and are toward the bottom of the chart; others don't (e.g., air travel, steel production, etc.) and are placed higher. The thick black line shows the electric frontier - the borderline of use cases that are served by electricity today. Decarbonizing the economy, then requires just five "simple" steps:

  1. Increasing the efficiency of any process to reduce the total energy needed (modern cars are leaps and bounds more efficient than those a couple decades ago)

  2. Electrifying use cases, e.g., switching to induction stoves, electric cars, or electric heating - this means pushing up the electric frontier

  3. Cleaning up the power grid, so that all of the use cases below the electric frontier get cleaned up "for free"

  4. Developing clean fuels for use cases above the electric frontier (such as green hydrogen, or e-fuels)

  5. Relying on high-quality carbon offsets to abate whatever's left.

This in turn gives insight into what we can do to personally clean up our energy consumption. Buying appliances that are electric (e.g., induction stoves over gas stoves, electric cars or plug-in hybrids over traditional gas cars), buying carbon-free power [1], and purchasing high-quality carbon offsets [2] can all work to reduce your carbon footprint.


1: Most plans in TX that advertise 100% renewable energy aren't actually buying renewable energy; they're buying production credits from wind and solar farms across the state. They're still helpful however - ultimately, the cost differential you're paying goes to wind and solar farms directly, which incentivizes more development for clean power.

2: Stripe Climate (https://stripe.com/climate) tends to identify good companies for this. A fair warning - true carbon removal is quite expensive; usually hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon you want removed.

1800 to 0: Pathways to a Zero-Carbon US Power Grid

After a year or so of work, I’ve finished up my thesis, which you can find in PDF format here. I’ve also posted in on my website in sections:

  • Chapter 1: Introduction talks about the importance of reaching a zero-carbon power grid, current progress toward that goal, how far we might have to go, and why just building a ton of wind and solar isn’t as great of a solution as it might seem.

  • Chapter 2: Getting to Zero talks about the technologies that will enable the zero-carbon transition: short-term and long-term energy shortage, the need to improve electricity transmission, why we should build more generation capacity than we need, and a brief discussion of nuclear and carbon capture. Finally, I turn to some studies and discuss how these technologies can work together in grids with high levels of renewable penetration.

  • Chapter 3: Policies talks about some of the policies that will drive the transition: Renewable Portfolio Standards, carbon pricing, region-based transmission planning, and supporting research and development efforts.

  • Appendix 1: Nomenclature talks about the difference between energy and power. It’s a great place to start in case you don’t know the difference!

  • Appendix 2: Emissions Costs from US Electricity Production details the costs we’re already paying when we pollute to produce electricity.

  • Appendix 3: Demand Response discusses some ways we can reduce electricity demand in crucial times.

  • Appendix 4: Bridge Fuels and Stranded Assets talks about how we’ll transition from today’s power grid to tomorrow’s, and some of the costs associated with that.

  • Appendix 5: Green Investing discusses ESG investing (and the limited impact that it has).

  • Appendix 6: Land Use discusses how much space we’ll need for a fully decarbonized power grid.

  • Appendix 7: Abbreviations Used lists out some of the abbreviations I’ve used.

Reading the PDF is a bit better, since the footnotes are actually visible on the bottom of the page (and I’m not sure how to jump to a particular point on a webpage using Squarespace) and since the photos are a bit higher quality (again, blame Squarespace). If you’re looking for the presentation, you can find that here.


This has been a wonderful project to work on, one that I’ve found incredibly fulfilling. I came into this project quite opinionated (especially since this is how I spend a large portion of my free time reading about clean energy and transportation), and I leave it with fresh perspective, hopefully a little bit further away from Mt. Stupid.

Some of the things that I’ve learned, in bullet-point format:

  • There’s a lot of uncertainty surrounding how much electricity we’ll need to produce in 2050, driven by uncertainties in how much electrification occurs in industry and transport. This has huge implications for how tractable the cost of decarbonizing the power sector is.

  • I went into this project thinking that hydrogen is totally useless. As it turns out, long-term energy storage is a pretty decent use case for hydrogen - though I don’t think you’ll be driving a hydrogen fuel cell car anytime (Chatper 2.2 has more information).

  • Electricity transmission is critically important, though it’s quite difficult to plan and permit. A regional planning model seems superior to our current build-as-you-go model, but there are many NIMBYs to overcome.

  • I previously had no real opinion on nuclear; I’m now fairly opinionated on it (but you’ll have to read Chapter 2.5 to learn what I think).

  • I previously thought that carbon capture was a waste of time; I’m now realizing just how necessary it’s going to be (see Chapter 2.6).

  • ESG investing doesn’t seem to have a high impact, at least for retail investors (Appendix 5 isn’t too clear about this caveat, but I chose to preserve the original text of my thesis).

  • Achieving net-zero emissions is going to be hard - but reducing emissions might not be.

  • There’s a large role to play for policies that support technologies taking the first steps down the experience curve (think Wright’s Law).

Much of my research came from Bloomberg, especially their wonderful New Energy Finance division. Nat Bullard and Michael Liebriech are great writers that I’d highly recommend, and the Switched On podcast is quite excellent also. Bill Gates’ book How to Avoid a Climate Disaster is great at breaking down the zero-carbon problem at large, and is a great first-read for anyone interested. Finally, the academic studies in Chapters 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 were quite useful in doing modeling work that I wasn’t equipped to do well.

As far as my original contributions, there was a bit of number crunching here and there, though I’d argue that the main effort that I put in was weaving the narrative together. Ideally, you’ll find all of my writing above easy-to-approach, such that even a first-time reader who knows little about electricity could understand it all.

Future projects could build off of my work by discussing offshore wind, modeling future cost reductions using experience curves and marginal production costs, and in turn asking the question of how much storage vs. excess generation is optimal, given projected costs.

Finally, this work would not be possible if it were not for my wonderful supervising professor, Dr. Kara Kockelman, and my excellent second reader, Amon Burton. I only met Dr. K through excellent student-mentor pairings by Zia Lyle and Greg Ross, to whom I give my greatest thanks for introducing me to a professor that has motivated me and pushed me to do work that I’m incredibly proud of. I must also thank Amon Burton and Lee Walker both for their work with organizing and leading the Skaaren Climate Fellowship. I want to thank those that have aided me in my work – namely Dr. Dave Tuttle and Dr. Ross Baldick. I thank the support, love, and help from my family and friends in this endeavor. Finally, I want to give my thanks to the tireless and often thankless work of the researchers and engineers that develop the technologies needed to move the world to a zero-carbon future. It is truly representative of pushing the boundaries of what’s possible, and it gives great reason for hope.

My Thesis Presentation

Well, my thesis is finally wrapping up, which means that I’m now able to start posting about it. I had originally planned to upload my work to my website section-by-section as I wrote it, but it turns out that I ended up rewriting and revising sections nearly constantly - perhaps whenever some new piece of information came to light, or when I found a better graphic than one I had used previously. I anticipate to stop working on my thesis after my defense on May 10th; until then, these talks that I gave should be reasonably set in stone.

Below is the presentation I gave at the Plan II Thesis Symposium in April 2021. There was a 15-minute time limit here, so I rushed through my (many) slides rather quickly, though I was more rehearsed:

I also re-recorded the talk afterwards at a more leisurely pace. The content is virtually identical, though there’s no Q&A session in this version:

You can find the slides for my talk at this link.

What happened to Texas?

If you’re interested in actually learning more about what happened to the Texas power grid over the past week (and by actually learning, I mean not just looking to point the finger at Democrats/Republicans/ERCOT/etc.) I’d highly recommend this amazing talk that Dr. Hao Zhu, a professor in UT Austin’s Electrical Engineering department, gave. She talks about all of the different sources of generation and what happened to them; what did/didn't go wrong with ERCOT; and whether Texas being more connected to the rest of the US grid would have helped things. To spoil it for you, ERCOT mostly did their job (to the extent that their power allows). Being more connected to the rest of the US/Mexican power grid wouldn't have really moved the needle in this situation. Finally, there isn't anything easy and obvious to fix right away. I found it really insightful and a refreshing break from "All wind turbines are evil" or "this is all Greg Abbott's fault". Then again, those messages don’t sell as well.

Emissions Costs from US Electricity Production

Step 1 for my thesis was to try and motivate the transition to a zero-carbon electricity grid, and I felt like the best way to do that was to try and put a dollar value on the costs we don’t pay for electricity - the electric bill doesn’t cover the externalities associated with pollution.

My supervisor sent me this paper by Goodkind et al. that made the claim

We estimate that anthropogenic PM2.5 was responsible for 107,000 premature deaths in 2011, at a cost to society of $886 billion. Of these deaths, 57% were associated with pollution caused by energy consumption [e.g., transportation (28%) and electricity generation (14%)]

So that’s it, right? $886B in total damages from US pollution overall, times 14% that’s due to electricity generation specifically. Not so fast. 14% is a remarkably round number for the scale of billions of dollars, so I had to dig through their appendix first to see the actual breakdown. As it turns out, the real breakdown is $118B for coal, $5B for natural gas, and another $2B for everything else. Slap on an inflation adjustment factor to move from 2011 dollars to 2020 dollars and we’re at $147 billion.

The catch is that the Goodkind paper doesn’t predict damages in dollars. It predicts damages in lives. That’s where the folks at the EPA (yes, the Environmental Protection Agency, of all places) come in, with the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL). The VSL converts the number of lives saved (here, 107,000) to a dollar value: currently, standard operating procedure is to use $7.4M in 2006 dollars, and just inflation-adjust that. Today, saving a statistical life is worth $9.6 million.

This allows us to get more than one estimate on the pollution costs from the US electricity sector. Fann et al. estimated that electricity emissions results in 38,000 premature deaths in 2005, which translates to $380B (in 2020 dollars) in damages - a much higher estimate.

Jaramillo and Muller (who also use the VSL method) find that electricity generation in 2011 caused $125B in damages (just like Goodkind!), which translates to $146 billion in today’s dollars (due to differences in rounding). They also found that electricity generation in 2005 caused $210B worth of damages in 2020 dollars, and attribute the overall decline over time to “increasingly stringent air pollution policy (either proposed or enacted), and macroeconomic conditions inclusive of the Great Recession”.

Let’s recap: Goodkind et al. and Jaramillo/Muller found that damages from US electricity production in 2011 were $146B (inflation-adjusted). Jaramillo/Muller and Fann et al. found that values from previous years were much higher. That variance can be explained by the fact that these estimates are derived from the cleanliness of the power grid - the US electricity sector is far cleaner today than it was in 2011, which is cleaner than it was in 2005. There’s been an enormous shift in energy sources (e.g. wind and natural gas play a much larger role than they used to), and modern fossil fuel plants are far more efficient than those built decades ago (though this latter point is unlikely to influence the results in a major way, since the difference between a coal plant from 2005 and a coal plant from 2011 isn’t that large).

I won’t attempt to estimate numbers for 2020, though I can confidently say that pollution damages are far lower. Goodkind and Jaramillo/Muller both found that the lion’s share of damages come from SO2 and NOx emissions (Goodkind says 91% on pages 20-21 of the appendix, Fig. 2 indicates similarly from Jaramillo/Muller), that most of these emissions come from coal (again, pages 20-21 of the appendix of Goodkind), and SO2 and NOx emissions have tanked in the past couple of decades. The location of those emissions complicates the relationship between emissions and costs, but a ~50% reduction in those emissions likely means that, thankfully, the power sector doesn’t destroy ~$150B in human life each year - at least due to SO2 and NOx emissions.

I must admit, I was perversely hoping for a higher number. I wanted to motivate my paper the highlighting the importance of transitioning to a zero-carbon electricity grid, but most of the work has already been done! Luckily for me, the externalities aren’t just pollution - climate change is likely to affect far more than a few hundred thousand lives.

The Impact of COVID-19 on Sustainability

I haven’t posted in a while with school and the pandemic, so I decided to go ahead and put up some of the more interesting projects I’ve been doing for school. This is a paper that was suppsosed to be 6 pages or so, double-spaced. Clearly, I went way beyond that. I’ve lightly edited the text.

Introduction

My goal is to explore how COVID-19 has impacted the march toward sustainability. This paper has three sections: the first attempts to overview the “pre-COVID” state of sustainability, especially with respect to the power and transportation sectors. The second discusses the short-term impacts that we’ve already experienced, and the third discusses potential future impacts and the possibility of “green stimulus” (stimulus with a focus on sustainability). Due to the length of this paper, it’s impossible to accurately cover everything in full detail – hence the decision to focus on the power and transportation sectors in particular. It’d be impossible to put everything together in one (small) document, but hopefully this paper can do a decent job of putting together enough puzzle pieces to get a sense of what the overall picture is supposed to look like.

1 | Where were we?

Here’s a breakdown of emissions by source for the world as a whole in 2016 and the US in 2018:

The Sankey chart [1] showing global emissions comes from the World Resources Institute, a pro-climate think tank over in Washington, while the pie chart comes from the US EPA. Note that the US (which is a much more advanced economy than the global aggregate) has a larger share of emissions coming from transportation than the rest of the world.

Pre-COVID, the most important global trend was the link between GDP growth and energy demand growth: to grow the economy, you had to have more energy to do so – energy that usually came from fossil fuels. However, that inexorable trend had finally started to break down. A 2019 article from McKinsey points to 4 key factors: (1) a decrease in GDP energy intensity, i.e. the amount of energy necessary per unit of economic activity, driven by a shift to more service-based economies, (2) an increase in energy efficiency, (3) the rise of electrification, and (4) trends toward renewables as an electricity source.

For brevity, I’ve chosen to leave out discussion on the trend to service economies (though McKinsey notes that the important shifts will come from India and China, as wealthier nations have already mostly shifted) and energy efficiency (while a growing global middle-class will buy more appliances and HVAC systems, the increase in demand will be offset by increased efficiencies in those machines). Overall, the important points are that McKinsey forecasted that “the energy needs per capita at a global level will be 10 percent less in 2050 than they were in 2016, despite the rapid rise in demand from the many households entering the middle class in emerging economies”.

Electrification in the Transport sector

The rise of electrification is pervasive across industries, but nowhere will it be more profound than in the transportation sector – especially due to its large share of the emissions mix in the highly developed countries and regions where EVs will first take hold (China, Europe, and the US). Automakers have an onslaught on new models slated to hit global markets, as this chart from McKinsey shows:

mck EV new models.png

All of this will reinforce existing growth trends in the market: global EV sales have been steadily growing over the past few years at well over 50% per year, and global market penetration rates have climbed accordingly, as shown in the figure below from McKinsey:

While increased public desire to live a more sustainable lifestyle is likely a contributing factor to the growth of EVs [2], decreasing manufacturing costs (especially from the battery, which accounts for a significant part of the EV powertrain cost) are likely the main driver. However, the price differential in cost of ownership between EVs and traditionally-powered vehicles is also likely to be a contributory factor; it's possible that the fall in gas prices may effect sales moving forward (at least in the short-term).

A Shift to Renewable Electricity

Complementary to the shift toward EVs is a shift toward renewable power generation, which accounts for 30% of global emissions and 27% of US emissions (as shown in the charts above). Especially since electrification will occur in places other than just the transportation sector, electricity demand both in the US and globally is forecasted to grow. The chart below from the EIA’s 2020 Annual Energy Outlook plots out forecasted electricity generation through 2050, and the IEA also anticipates global growth in electricity generation:

Long-term projections from the EIA. Click to expand.

Long-term projections from the IEA. Click to expand.

Rising electricity demand is only one part of the story. As the graphs above indicate, the second (crucial) part is a shift in the electricity mix, the sources from which we generate electricity. Renewables (especially wind and solar) are set to grow exponentially over time, as coal demand (especially in developed economies) wanes. This is predominantly driven by pure economics: renewable options such as wind and solar will become the cheapest source of electrons nearly everywhere in the world within a few years:

Indeed, in countries such as the US, the electricity mix has already begun to clean itself up: the chart below (from 2017) shows what the emissions from the power sector would have looked like had the status quo from 2005 kept its course.

This chart actually highlights the trends we’ve seen over the past few years: lower demand growth from increasing efficiency (and a more service-based economy than we’ve seen in years prior), a change in the energy mix (natural gas has exploded, coal has declined), and a shift in favor of renewables.

To be clear, there are also other trends in the sustainability movement, e.g. the rise of ESG investing; investment into renewables in general; and the development of fake meat (see: Beyond Meat, Impossible Foods). Nevertheless, most trends in the world were positive ones (whether these changes would have been “enough” to hit some arbitrary threshold is a point I choose to leave out for brevity).

2 | What’s Happened so far?

Having discussed pre-COVID trends in sustainability, we now turn to some of the effects that the pandemic has had on the environment. Of course, these are inextricably linked to the state of the economy – as economic activity increases/decreases, so too do emissions outputs. As of May 8, unemployment in the US reached 14.7%, worse than any point since the Great Depression. China’s GDP contracted 6.8% (Q1 2020 vs. Q1 2019) and the US’s GDP fell 4.8% (again, Q1 ’20 vs. Q1 ‘19). Thus, we might expect to see some beneficial effects – and while they are there, there have also been some negative ones. The main theme: COVID-19 has been mostly good, though not perfect for the environment as a whole.

Starting off with some good news: in the electricity sector, demand for coal (the dirtiest of fossil fuels) is expected by drop 8% globally in 2020 versus the previous year [3], according to forecasts from the IEA. This number is more severe in developed nations, where coal was already on the decline: the IEA expects a 20% drop in coal demand in Europe and a 25% drop in the US. Meanwhile, renewable energy generation continues to grow, since these sources operate with near-zero marginal cost. Several regions across the world have experienced year-over-year declines in power demand [4]:

Above ground, the decline in air travel has already reduced CO2 emissions by 10 million metric tons – according to older data from mid-March. The total decline is likely much higher and growing by the day. On the roads, COVID has reduced congestion: data from TomTom indicates a near 60% drop in traffic congestion in Mumbai, and a near 30% drop in London. In the US, StreetLight Data created a map of the decrease in daily vehicle miles traveled:

Adding these effects from reduced economic activity together, the IEA forecasts that emissions in 2020 will be 2.6 billion metric tons of CO2 lower than in 2019 – about an 8% year-over-year drop. In usually polluted cities, there’s also been a drop in particulate matter: Los Angeles, Delhi, and Mumbai are all experiencing a roughly 50% drop in PM2.5 compared to pre-COVID.

That’s all good news (even if it stems from an unfortunate cause). However, not everything is sunshine and roses: single-use plastics and paper products are on the rise in an attempt to reduce disease spread, and cratering oil prices (itself the result of lower demand from COVID) have resulted in the price spread between recycled and virgin plastics widening (which will in turns shrink demand for recycled plastics among firms that haven’t truly committed to sustainable processes). Indeed, the fall in gas prices may have contributed to an undesired shift in which vehicles are selling: in the US, pickups are now outselling passenger sedans [5].

3 | Future impacts, moving forward, and “Green stimulus”

Any discussion of the long-term effects of COVID-19 is likely to be reasonably-informed speculation at best, so I primarily rely on the opinions of experts in this section.

As far as electricity demand goes, the US EIA publishes their forecasts in the Short-Term Energy Outlook (previous released on April 7th, though the next update is tomorrow on May 12th). Highlights include (1) a general decrease in electricity production over 2020 and 2021; (2) coal being particularly hard hit in 2020, while renewables continue to grow healthily; and (3) an expectation of delays in bringing new capacity (predominantly renewables) onto the grid. I was unable to find any high-quality recent forecasts from reputable sources for the global community, though I’d wager that other developed regions (such as Europe) will likely experience similar trends.

While lockdowns may subside in the coming months, it’s unlikely that end-consumers will rapidly revert to pre-COVID behaviors. While this may spell trouble for restaurants, bars, and theaters, it’s worth contemplating whether in-person meetings will fully recover (and since business customers are often the most profitable consumer segment for airlines, they’re in trouble, too, though the impacts on emissions are less clear: fuel prices are a huge cost driver for airlines. In any scenario, air travel only accounts for about 2% of emissions). Additionally, health concerns (along with cheaper gas, at least for now) have driven heavier hits in public transit ridership than private car driving: Apple reports that in Berlin, driving is only 28% below normal, while transit use is down 61%. Similar patterns have emerged in Ottawa, Madrid, and other large cities, as shown in the chart below:

As job losses mount and consumer preferences shift, the question for governments and agencies around the world becomes one of recovery: what are the next steps to take? What values and priorities are top of mind? Which policies are most beneficial? An Oxford Smith school survey I came across from May 4th surveyed “231 central bank officials, finance ministry officials, and other economic experts from G20 countries on the relative performance of 25 major fiscal recovery archetypes across four dimensions: speed of implementation, economic multiplier, climate impact potential, and overall desirability.” Highlights include (1) a consensus that unconditional airline bailouts would be not only a poor use of stimulus funds, but also be likely to have a negative environmental impact; (2) consensus that clean energy infrastructure investment and clean R&D spending would be highly positive for the environment, though slow to kick in and not particularly stellar at stimulating the economy [6]; and (3) consensus that some rescue-type policies such as liquidity support for households and small businesses, temporary wage increases direct cash transfers, and direct provision of basic needs (funds to help produce and distribute necessities such as food and medicine) would be fast-acting, highly economically-effective strategies (if not necessarily the best for the environment). The results from the survey are summarized in the chart below:

It’s impossible to know just yet if governments will enact these policies, though recent stimulus packages by the US government such as the CARES Act included provisions to assist airlines ($58 billion), individuals (estimated $560 billion), and small businesses ($377 billion).

Conclusion

Before COVID-19 hit, the world was making progress on cleaning up two of the highest-polluting sectors both globally and domestically: power generation and transportation [7]. COVID-19 has greatly slowed down the economy, which in turn has created a temporary reduction in emissions, especially in the power and transportation sectors. As the world recovers from the impact of the virus, however, the environmental impact is less clear: an increase in personal vehicle usage may counteract any drop in emissions; thankfully, short-term forecasts in the US seem to indicate the electricity sector will continue to progress. Green stimulus has been presented as a means of supporting both the economy and the environment, though what actually ends up happening is a great unknown.


[1] One of my absolute favorite data visualization tools.

[2] I didn’t want to waste words on this topic, but some quality reports from the ICCT and the UCS outline the lifecycle emissions differences.

[3] The “magic number” is 7.6% - we’d need global emissions to fall by 7.6% per year over the course of the 2020s to be on a 1.5-degree pathway [Source: page XX of this document]. For better and for worse, the IEA thinks we’ll do it in 2020.

[4] Interestingly enough, I tried analyzing load data from ERCOT, which operates the grid that most of Texas runs on, and didn’t find any drop in electricity demand, at least when I averaged hourly loads across the month. I’m not sure why exactly electricity demand from Texas hasn’t changed that much, since I’m comparing April to April, though at least anecdotally I feel like there’s been more temperate weather than normal.

[5] This may just be a reflection on ongoing trends. Passenger sedan sales were already falling pre-COVID, and it’s possible that the economy is hitting the consumer base for passenger sedans more than pickups – presumably, commercial sales represent some portion of pickup sales, and this segment of demand is potentially less likely to be effected by the state of the economy.

[6] An excellent example of this is the story of how Texas became one of the largest wind electricity generators in the world. This article from Texas Monthly does a masterful job of storytelling.

[7] It’s worth noting that increased efficiency in conventionally-powered vehicles has had a much larger impact on emissions than EVs have. I didn’t really focus on this topic as much since EVs and power generation play hand-in-hand, though I’d certainly be remiss if I didn’t at least mention the improvements in fuel economy across automotive fleets as a whole.

Is the Cybertruck a Good Business Move?

Cybertruck has finally been unveiled. After being told it was going to “blow your mind” (boy, was Kimbal right!) and consequently having my mind blown with what I still assert is a ludicrous design, I finally got around to asking the real question: is this going to be any good for the company? $TSLA fell a hair over 6% the day after the unveiling (on a day where the S&P 500 ticked ever-so-slightly up, and automotive companies like $F and $GM both rose by about 2%), so clearly the initial reaction from investors wasn’t favorable. Indeed, I decided during the unveil that I’d be selling all of my shares the next morning for two reasons:

  1. Pricing. Cybertruck is incredibly cheap for what it offers. Even if it won’t be available until 2021 (2022 for the tri-motor version), I worried that margins would be low on a vehicle that offers 500 miles of range [1] for $70k, or 250 miles of range (in a pickup body, which implies a higher battery capacity) for $40k. Even though pickup trucks are the cash cows of Ford and GM, I wasn’t sure that Tesla would be able to achieve the same gross margins as the company was accustomed to (especially when the Standard Range Plus Model 3 is $39,000).

  2. Design. Simply put, if a design is called “polarizing”, someone’s probably trying to avoid using the word “ugly”. I used the words “ludicrous design”, which again is my way of saying “ugly”. A large part of what made Tesla successful as it grew where other companies failed was that its EVs didn’t look dorky or different for the sake of being different; the Model S looked familiar and approachable. Tesla’s Model X and Model 3 certainly have a fair number of people that can rightfully complain about certain styling cues or quirks (e.g. the bulbous rear-end on Model X, the strange lip on the Model 3), but ultimately the cars look similar to other vehicles in their class. Cybertruck, however, does not look like another pickup truck, and I worried that its design would limit its appeal to the buying public.

the morning after

And so, I liquidated my position. Since that reactionary decision, however, there’s been a ton of information that I realized wasn’t in the actual presentation. We learned more about the function of the design (and how much more simple production would be) thanks to a MotorTrend article, that 200,000 people (and counting) have given Tesla $100 for a mere spot in line, and that the vast majority of those line-waiters have stated the desire to purchase dual/tri-motor trims. Perhaps I was wrong to worry about pricing and margins - in the next few years, surely Tesla will be able to continue driving down the cost of battery/vehicle manufacturing and find margins there.

However, I’m still not sure about whether the design is right. 200,000 people may have given the company $100 for a spot in line, but $100 isn’t all that much money for a minimum-$40,000 vehicle and I don’t know what the actual conversion rate will be in a field that’s bound to become more competitive (it is, however, the best gauge of demand that we have to go off of.) Customer demographics are incredibly important here to determine if Tesla made the right call in designing a Blade Runner retro-futurist Thing (i.e. Cybertruck) instead of just a normal-looking pickup truck with an electric powertrain and a minimalistic cabin (what I’ll call a “Tesla F-150”). From what I can tell, much of the functionality (e.g. Tesla Armor Glass, the versatile bed, the usual crazy performance numbers) isn’t inextricably linked to the weird design, and Tesla could have put many of those things into a Tesla F-150.

So, the questions in my mind include:

  1. How will the current, existing customer base for pickups react? Will Cybertruck steal market share from other pickups?

  2. How will non-pickup-drivers react? Will Cybertruck grow the market overall for pickups?

  3. How will current Tesla owners react? Will there be cannibalization?

ford, gm, and fca are sleeping well

Ultimately, I don’t think Ford, GM, and FCA are going to worry anytime soon about Cybertruck stealing market share from the F-150 or Silverado. Pickup truck brand loyalty is insanely high, and most of the existing pickup market is dominated by Detroit, despite Toyota and Honda both trying to break into the market:

Generally speaking, I just don’t think that the current pickup truck buyers - mostly men, mostly representing heavier industries (e.g. construction, agriculture, etc.) - are going to see the appeal in a trapezoid-on-wheels. Besides, if the Mach-E is anything to go off of, Ford’s inevitable electric F-150 will be a solid product when it finally launches, and I’m betting that more traditional pickup buyers will prefer a more traditional design.

But would a Tesla F-150 have been able to crack the market? Autopilot and an insane powertrain are great selling points for sure, but would current pickup buyers have actually switched from their current vehicles? Even for the Ram 1500, F-150, and Silverado, loyalty doesn’t crack 50%, which means that over half of all pickup buyers aren’t buying the same car again. There are so many different arguments that could be made on both sides.

growing the market

Will Cybertruck attract new customers? Unfortunately, I don’t know how many of the 200k line-waiters are from people who don’t currently own pickup trucks. If I’m being logically consistent with the previous section, then most of them are probably new to the pickup segment. However, we don’t know what the conversation rate will be like from $100 deposit to actual $40/50/70K check, and we don’t know the full number of non-pickup-owners that would be interested in Cybertruck.

From people that I’ve talked to, nearly everyone that thinks the Cybertruck looks good (these people exist!) is on the early-adopter side of the spectrum for technology in general, which implies that people that have never owned a pickup truck (much less thought about getting one) are interested in Cybertruck. I’m not getting the best sample, since nearly all of my friends are EE or CS-types, and disproportionately from well-off backgrounds in urban and suburban parts of Texas. At the same time, this raises a major concern: what if the strong initial demand comes only from early adopters? That is, what if early adopters have product desires so different from the rest of the market that Cybertruck will fail to cross the chasm?

While a Tesla F-150 wouldn’t pull in as many non-pickup-owners as Cybertruck will, I feel confident saying that it’ll have more long-term mass-market appeal. The Cybertruck design is polarizing, and most people wouldn’t be caught dead in the rendering-in-progress.

cannibalization

It seems ludicrous to assume that a pickup could steal sales of a sports-sedan. After all, who would want a nimble, quick sedan and instead get a heavy, large pickup? To be clear, I don’t think that many people would. However, there is likely a not-insignificant portion of Tesla buyers that merely want a Tesla, as opposed to a Model S/3/X/Y. These buyers may wonder why they should drop $39,490 on a Model 3 Standard Range Plus when they could spend an additional $410 and get a vehicle that’s far more utilitarian (both in terms of seating and storage), has similar handling, and has similar autonomous driving capabilities.

Again, I don’t think that the person of people indecisive between a pickup truck and a sports sedan is large. I do, however, think that the number of people who just want any Tesla is nonzero, and I wonder if that represents a threat to Model 3 demand. In any scenario, I don’t know if Cybertruck pricing makes sense yet within the Tesla product portfolio. I also don’t know enough about trucks to make comparisons to Ford/GM/FCA products, so it’s unclear to me which trim packages align with Cybertruck.

so, was cybertruck the right call?

I don’t know, and I don’t know that anyone does. I do know breaking into the market requires getting noticed with a product that isn’t a duplicate what of your competitors offer you, especially when brand loyalty is high. I know that Cybertruck’s ability to cross the chasm is something that worries me, and yet I wonder if a Tesla F-150 would have received traction in the first place. I’d love to hear what y’all think.


[1] If you’re towing something heavy, I expect range to dip drastically, and I can imagine that that’s what drove Tesla to offer a 500-mile-range variant. Based on this video, towing could realistically half the range (and maybe more), so imagine the 500-mile-range more as “200-ish-miles-when-towing”.

About that Mach-E...

I sat down tonight to watch the (cringey) live unveiling of the new Ford Mustang Mach-E, and here are some thoughts I have on the product. As an up-front disclaimer, I saw the specs leak onto Reddit on Friday and bought some stock in Ford.

the name, performance, and range

I’ve seen and heard countless enthusiasts complain about the name. “How could an SUV wear the Mustang badge? Why not revive the old Lightning nameplate? Why not just Mach-E?” The good news is that enthusiasts don’t run the marketing teams at Ford. Mustang is an incredibly strong brand, and it stands for (among other things, since brands always mean slightly different things to different people) performance and freedom. For most people, the Mach-E will deliver on both of those measures in spades. The slowest Mach-E does 0-60 in the mid 6-second range, so that combined with the instant torque means that the Mach-E will feel absolutely quick to any normal person. The fastest Mach-E does 0-60 in the “mid 3 second range”, which is more or less the same text that Ford uses to describe their GT500 Mustang. I’m not trying to suggest that it’ll be the same speed on the track as a GT500, but for 99.9% of driving for 99.9% of the population, the Mach-E will in every respect be blisteringly fast. In no way, shape, or form can anyone reasonably argue that the Mach-E won’t be quick. Even compared to the upcoming Model Y, comparably-priced trims have comparable 0-60 performance.

In terms of freedom, the Mach-E doesn’t offer a single trim that gets under 200 miles of range, and the longest-range Mach-E will hopefully get around 300 miles on a charge. If that last number sounds familiar, that’s because that’s the exact range of the Model Y RWD Long Range. The Mach-E, funnily enough, also achieves their 300 miles with a long-range, RWD model.

So the Mach-E will be exactly want many, many people want: a Mustang SUV that happens to be electric.

pricing and unit economics

Perfection. To get a sense of comparison here, the Mach-E is more or less the size of an Escape (granted, it’s a slightly different body style, but the Mach-E’s dimensions are 186” x 74” x 63” [1] while the Escape is at 181” x 74” x 66”), while earning significantly more revenue per vehicle than an Escape. The cheapest Mach-E will be a hair under $44k, compared to about $25k for a base Escape. Meanwhile, the highest-end Escape starts around $33k, and the highest-end (non-GT) Mach-E is around $60k. So Ford is going to be earning revenue hand-over-fist with these cars. Taking a look at the competition, Tesla is pricing their Long Range Model Y at $48k/$52k for the RWD/AWD versions, which compares favorably to the $52k-ish pricetag of the 300-mile range model of the Mach E. As far as performance models are concerned, the GT and the Model Y Performance are both around $60k. Tesla and Ford are usually earning similar amounts of revenue per car.

That doesn’t mean it’s a competitive fight, however. Thanks to the way that EV incentives are structured (which I’ve written about here), Tesla customers won’t get a tax credit when they buy a Model Y, while I’d imagine that every single Mach-E buyer in 2020 will get the full $7,500 tax credit [2].

Unfortunately for Ford, revenue isn’t profit, and we need to look at the other side of the equation. In terms of costs, I’d imagine that similar dimensions to the Escape means that, excluding the powertrain, the Mach-E will cost roughly the same as an Escape would for the body-in-white, and that we’d need to add a bit more for the interior, since the Mach-E will be nicer overall than an Escape [3]. The elephant in the room, however, is the battery. How much is Ford paying for the battery? We already know that Ford only plans on producing two battery sizes: one 75.7 kWh and one 98.8 kWh version. While I can’t confidently give cost estimates for how much Ford would spend on producing (or buying) a battery, my gut feeling tells me that they’ll start off just breaking even on the lower, cheaper trims, a feeling that’s reinforced by the fact that only the First Edition and Premium trims (both of which sticker for above $50k) will be released before 2020 is over.

they’ve copied tesla where it counts…

From what I can tell, Ford did virtually everything correct in learning from Tesla when it comes to the vehicle’s design. There’s a front trunk, a nice amount of space inside the car, quick acceleration, driver assistance features bundled in, OTA software updates, a giant 15” touchscreen for controlling virtually everything inside the car… and then there’s also a display right in front of the driver for checking speed, and an actual, physical volume knob. Ford didn’t make the car butt-ugly like GM did with the Bolt; they didn’t neuter the range like Audi did with the e-tron, and they didn’t make something overly ambitious like the hundreds of startups that will likely never see the light of day.

Ford made an SUV first. SUVs are what’s selling nowadays, and Ford’s bread-and-butter is SUVs and pickup trucks.

…except charging.

The only thing that stands out to me as being inadequate with the Mach-E is the fast charging ability. Ford claims that you can get 47 miles of range in 10 minutes using a 150kW DC fast charger, but that seems a bit off. Some quick number-crunching I did says that Ford is getting about 3 miles per kWh (300 miles / 98.8 kWh on the battery), and a charge rate of 150 kW translates to a peak charging speed of 450 mph. If Ford can sustain 150 kW of charging for 10 minutes, that alone should be 75 miles of range gained. Perhaps Ford’s battery can’t sustain fast charging for that long - but I struggle to understand why, given that most of their competitors can do that. Perhaps there are some inefficiencies I’m not factoring in, but I don’t see how that would account for a 37% discrepancy. Those lower numbers combined with a lack of a first-party charging network mean that (at least, in my opinion) the Mach-E’s weak point will be long-distance charging infrastructure.

but who cares?

Seriously, the Mach-E should sell incredibly well. It’s a solid EV (good) that’s an SUV (great) and wears one of the most famous brands in automotive history (amazing). It looks like Ford has a mostly-great product on their hands.


[1] https://www.ford.com/cmslibs/content/dam/brand_ford/en_us/brand/suvs-crossovers/mache/3-2/pdf/CX727_Tech_Specs.pdf

[2] The best information I can find seems to indicate that Ford has already sold about 116K plug-ins through June 2019, and that they would have sold another 3K from June until now at their 2019 average rate. While Ford won’t be able to hold onto incentives forever, they’ll get to enjoy the benefits for the start of the Mach-E launch. Source: https://evadoption.com/ev-sales/federal-ev-tax-credit-phase-out-tracker-by-automaker/

[3] We have to start somewhere, but I don’t like not being able to put concrete numbers on this.

Electric Vehicle Incentives

Today, a bipartisan group of legislators introduced a bill into the federal legislature that would strengthen the current EV tax credit in place in the United States. I’m not the biggest fan of it, and in this post, I’ll explain why.

My Values

To be clear, I’m no unbiased individual.

  • I currently own shares of both $GM and $TSLA, both of whom are at a disadvantage under the current system of EV incentives.

  • Keeping my bias in mind, I prefer to support companies that are first-to-market and pushing the boundaries of new technology. To the extent that technology subsidies are supposed to accelerate the adoption of that technology, I believe that supporting the early innovators and adopters is important.

  • I like the idea of tying subsidies to performance, to the extent that it’s possible to do so and makes sense (i.e. there needs to be clear metrics on what defines “performance”, and it needs to be the case that those metrics are easy to measure).

  • I’m also partial to the idea that, at least for this particular case, a subsidy passed by the US government ought to benefit US automakers.

  • While EV subsidies are far from the worst way to spend money, I’d still prefer incentive structures where total payouts are lower than higher.

  • I’d also prefer incentives to help make technology accessible for everyone, not just a small group of well-off individuals.

To be clear, I still believe that EVs are better products and that it would be optimal to accelerate their adoption.

The Current System

The current system is slightly confusing at first, but it isn’t too bad - the exact same system applies for both plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) and pure EVs (BEVs). Here’s a link to the IRS webpage that lays everything out.

Basically, each model has an associated credit:

  • If the car is either a PHEV or a BEV, the subsidy is at least $2,500 (run-of-the-mill hybrids, like the Prius, get nothing).

  • If the battery pack has a capacity of 5 kWh or more, add $417 to the subsidy.

  • For each kWh of battery capacity over 5 kWh, add another $417, up until the subsidy hits $7,500.

  • This implies that the max subsidy is hit when your battery stores at least 16 kWh of energy - the car is electrically driven, so there’s $2,500. The first 5 kWh give another $417, and the next 11 kWh give another 11*$417. This comes out to $7,504, which gets capped at $7,500.

Once manufacturers sell 200,000 PHEVs or BEVs in the US, the countdown timer begins:

  • For example, Tesla sold its 200,000th EV in the US in July of 2018. This begins the countdown.

  • For the calendar quarter in which the 200,000th car was sold and the quarter after that, nothing changes. In other words, since Tesla sold the vehicle #200,000 in July, then nothing changes in either the first quarter (July-September) or the one after that (October-December). Likewise, GM sold their 200,000th EV/PHEV in Q4 of 2018. This means that nothing changes for Q4 ‘18 or Q1 ‘19.

  • For the next six months, the EV incentive is halved on PHEVs or EVs from that manufacturer. In other words, a car that previously would have earned $4,000 in subsidies now only earns $2,000. There’s no limit to the number of cars this can apply to. For Tesla, the subsidies were halved starting on 1/1/2019, GM’s EV subsidy phase-out began on 4/1/2019.

  • For the next six months after that, the EV incentive is further halved. Again, there’s no limit on the number of sales. A car originally earning $4,000 in subsidies now earns only $1,000. This kicks in for Tesla on 7/1/2019, and for GM on 10/1/2019.

  • Finally, after another six months, the manufacturer’s cars are ineligible for federal EV subsidies. Anyone buying an EV from Tesla after 1/1/2020 or a PHEV/EV from GM after 4/1/2020 gets nothing.

For clarification, the companies themselves don’t get any subsidy checks from the government. They do, however, enjoy more competitive post-subsidy prices. Here’s a helpful webpage that lists each car by manufacturer, how much of a subsidy it has, and when the subsidies begin to phase-out.

What today’s bill would do

Disclaimer: I haven’t read the bill myself, and am relying on the summary put out by Sen. Stabenow, along with articles put out by Bloomberg, The Hill, and Reuters. I don’t know the exact specifics.

What seems clear is that the structure doesn’t change too much. Essentially, after the first phase of 200,000 vehicles, another phase would kick-in, this time with capacity for 400,000 vehicles and a subsidy limit of $7,000 per vehicle. The phase-out period is reduced to around nine months, though I don’t understand how exactly that’s implemented (the 25% phase appears to be eliminated). There’s also a portion of the bill related to hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, but that’s not what I’d like to focus on.

While I’m no political expert, I don’t believe the bill to be likely to pass. I doubt President Trump wants to sign a bill supporting additional spending on EVs, and I don’t think a supermajority in Congress is likely, either.

Issues

Whether we analyze the potential bill or the current system, I believe that there are a few issues. Some are the result of bad design from the start, others are the victim of their own success - the number automakers either currently producing or planning to produce EVs is significantly higher than it was a decade earlier.

Tax credits aren’t the best incentive. For clarification, the subsidy is run as a tax credit received by the buyer. This creates several problems, the first of which is that you can’t use more of a tax credit than your tax liability, according to Edmunds. In other words, if you earn an EV tax credit of $7,500 but you owe $4,000 in taxes, you only get $4,000. You can’t roll the unused portion over to the next year, nor will you get a check for the difference. This structure, therefore, benefits higher-income buyers far more, instead of a system where the incentive is always the benefit that the buyer receives.

Tax credits also don’t grant a benefit at the time of purchase, and delayed gratification doesn’t work well for many end consumers. When purchasing a new vehicle, taxes and other fees can amount to thousands of dollars out of pocket at the time of purchase. The tax credit, however, must wait until the next April, creating a liquidity problem for buyers.

Ultimately, tax credits aren’t an optimal means of administering subsidies, and research agrees. Hardman et al. reviewed 35 papers on the influence of incentives on EV adoption and found that consumers valued incentives at the time of purchase more than incentives later on (e.g. sales tax exemptions given at the time of sale were more valuable to consumers than tax credits). Specifically, the studies found that sales and registration tax exemptions were more effective than other forms of incentives, e.g. toll waivers, free parking, and HOV lane access.

Incentives apply equally to expensive and mass-market vehicles. The same study-of-studies found that incentives are less important for more expensive vehicles (e.g. Tesla’s Model S or X, which today starts at $85,000 and $89,500, respectively). This is pretty intuitive, as $7,500 represents potentially less than 10% off of a base Model S but over 20% off of a base Model 3.

International sales make the current system easy to game. Note that the only sales that count toward the 200,000 vehicle limit are US sales. This means that hypothetically, a company could choose to reach 199,999 US sales at the end of the quarter, ship all other vehicles overseas, and then make its 200,000th sale on the first day of a quarter, lengthening the time for which incentives are available. Furthermore, companies abroad could grow their production abilities overseas, and only come to the US once their quarterly production rate is significant, allowing many more vehicles to qualify for the credit than, say, an American company that grows organically from the start. By the time both companies reach 200,000 US sales, it’s likely that the foreign company has a much faster sales and production rate, and thus benefits more from the subsidy.

Industry pioneers are held at a disadvantage. Consider the two companies which have already begun the incentive phase out - GM and Tesla. Tesla was an industry pioneer; GM was the first to sell a vehicle with usable range at a mass market price point. While these two companies face declining incentives, competitors such as Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, Hyundai, and Kia can all reap the benefit of the full subsidy. While Tesla and GM invested into R&D, battery prices around the world steadily dropped, and now other players are entering the market. Tesla and GM no longer have a competitive advantage for being first-movers in the market; if anything, the incentives have generated a competitive disadvantage. Back in 2009, such a situation may have been hard to predict; today, the market has shifted sufficiently.

Pardon my more nationalistic side, though I believe that American companies are being disadvantaged by American subsidies.

The current system stands to spend a lot of money. Suppose a manufacturer (say, Tesla) only built cars that qualified for the full $7,500 credit. Further suppose that they were able to sell 200,000 vehicles in the US, and that buyers generally were able to take full advantage of the tax credit. Even before accounting for future US sales during the phase-out, the subsidies have amounted to $1.5 billion. That number is complicated by many factors: as I’ve already mentioned, it’s unclear how many additional vehicles they’ll sell in the US and at what subsidy level and it’s unclear whether US buyers took full advantage of the tax credit. For other manufacturers, it’s unclear if Porsche will sell 200,000 EVs by the time the current system has disappeared. Nevertheless, here’s a list of some manufacturers: BMW, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar, Kia, Mercedes-Benz, Nissan, Porsche, Tesla, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Volvo. Each one has sold vehicles that had some level of subsidy attached to them (not all vehicles had the full $7,500; some were PHEVs). Nevertheless, if those manufacturers alone averaged out to $1.5 billion each, the total bill would come to $21 billion. [1] Furthermore, there’s no limit to the amount that we might spend. New startups or existing automakers that I haven’t listed could explode into the EV market and sell more cars.

Superior products enjoy similar benefits as inferior ones. Ultimately, the largest drawback that the current system presents is that it subsidizes barebones EVs just as much as full-fledged ones. As an example, suppose that automaker A comes to market with an EV that gets a range of 204 miles (according to the EPA), while automaker T sells an EV with 295 miles of range (again, according to the EPA). Holding everything else constant, should we subsidize the two vehicles equally? Going further, suppose that company B makes an EV can travel 114 miles on a charge, yet has a battery pack larger than 16 kWh. Does it make sense to subsidize company B’s product as much as company T’s? If one of the goals of electric vehicle incentives is to support electric transportation, and vehicles with lower ranges get used less than vehicles with longer ranges [2], then surely we ought to align incentives with the number of electric miles that the average person travels.

A few small tweaks

Here’s a small, basic improvement that I believe would fix the issues of total spend and pioneer disadvantage: decide the total amount of money to be spent, and then hand out subsidies until the total pool is exhausted. For example, if we decide that we’d like to spend a total of $10 billion for subsidizing EVs, create a $10 billion pool and allocate it out to the various manufacturers as they sell cars. Not only would total spend be limited, but the incentive structure is now set up to benefit whichever company produces the most EVs. Companies are no longer penalized for selling too many EVs while their competition catches up.

Of course, this could be combined with several other smaller proposals. Perhaps we deliver the subsidy at the time of purchase as a sales tax reduction/exemption, or allow the income tax credit to be rolled over to future years. Perhaps we introduce a maximum price for which vehicles qualify. Perhaps we restructure the incentive calculation to account for the technological progress made over the past decade.

a more encompassing re-do

All of the previous proposals combine into what I’d propose as a new system. I call it the “quarter roll-down”. Here are my proposals:

  • Subsidies should be based on the EPA tested electric-only range. This allows both PHEVs and EVs to use the same incentive system without too much confusion. I’m not 100% familiar with the method that the EPA uses to obtain range ratings for EVs, so changes might need to be made here. However, this finally allows us to treat better products, better.

  • In addition to a total incentive pool size (say, $25 billion), introduce a “sunset date” of say, 5 years from the date of passage of the bill. Once the total incentive pool has been depleted, or the sunset date has passed, the incentive program is over.

  • For each vehicle, calculate the incentive as miles of electric-only EPA range x quarters until sunset date. In other words, an EV with 300 miles of range sold at the beginning of the program (i.e. 20 quarters, or 5 years, remaining) would receive a subsidy of $300 x 20 = $6,000. With only 3 years remaining, the same vehicle would receive $300 x 12 = $3,600. This allows incentives to diminish over time, as technology improves and battery prices drop.

  • Remove all manufacturer limits on incentives. If a car is sold in the US while the program is ongoing, it gets the incentive.

  • Restructure incentive payouts as an immediate sales tax deduction. If there’s excess credit, allow it to be used as an income tax payment, and allow excess tax paid to be refunded.

  • Vehicles with a sticker price of $50,000 or higher are unable to receive subsidies.

I’d love to hear about what y’all think. I’m sure that there are a few points that I’m missing - please let me know. Also, a lot of the information I found is based off of a term paper I wrote last semester. If you’d like to read, you can find a copy here.

pushing back

Should EV incentives really be limited to certain price brackets? A very valid point is that more expensive cars tend to get worse mileage; replacing those cars with EVs is better for the environment. Nevertheless, something feels wrong to me about subsidizing more expensive vehicles. I’m certainly willing to concede that I’m being illogical, but consider a hypothetical electric sports sedan that reaches a price of $130,000. Would this buyer really need an incentive in the thousands to convince him/herself to buy an electric vehicle? Ultimately, however, this is not the hill I’d die on.

[1] It’s unclear, to me at least, whether different brands under the same parent company would individually qualify for the EV incentives.

[2] The California Air Resources Board published a 2017 study calculating the number of electric miles driven by various PHEVs and EVs. Model S drivers averaged around 13,500 miles each year, while Volts averaged around 7,500 electric miles each year. Meanwhile, shorter-electric-range PHEVs like the Ford Fusion Energi traveled only about 2,500 electric miles each year, on average.

Welcome to the Arena: Hydrogen as a Competitor to Electric Transportation

Background

The world is moving toward zero-carbon transportation, and right now the two most publicized candidates for powering movement are electricity and hydrogen. Electric vehicles have an early lead, but a network of automakers and energy companies are hedging their bets by developing technology for hydrogen-powered transport. Having spent a few weeks at a previous internship looking at the economics of hydrogen, I don’t think that EVs have anything to worry about. In this post, I’ll talk explain why by looking at hydrogen’s current penetration and economics. I’ll also talk about where I think hydrogen does have a distinct advantage.

Products

Before we dive into the broad market trends, it’s helpful to understand the product itself. A battery electric vehicle (BEV) contains a large battery that provides electric power to motors which drive the car. BEVs don’t have a tank to fill up, so you can’t put gasoline (or hydrogen) into it. A fuel-cell electric vehicle (FCEV) also contains a battery, but it’s relatively small in size and energy storage capacity. Hydrogen is pumped (much like gasoline) into a tank, and a hydrogen fuel cell uses the H2 to generate electricity. The electricity can recharge the battery, and everything else is the same – in both cases, the battery delivers electric power to motors which drive the wheels. A hydrogen car is fundamentally an electric car; the only difference is between a large battery and no hydrogen equipment (BEV) and a small battery with hydrogen equipment (FCEV). At its core, hydrogen isn’t an energy source, it’s an energy storage medium.

Because of FCEVs are still electric vehicles, FCEVs also have the instant torque and quiet operation of BEVs. The primary difference to the end user is that you can charge a BEV at home (so you’ll wake up every day with a full battery); you can recharge an FCEV much faster. Owning an FCEV requires little change in behavior, owning a BEV requires a change. Note I’m ignoring plug-in hybrids (of the gasoline or hydrogen kind).

Current Penetration

There’s a chicken-and-egg problem when it comes to hydrogen: there aren’t that many fueling stations, so not many consumers are willing to buy FCEVs – which means that there isn’t an incentive to build expensive fueling stations in the first place. The best data that I can find indicates that there are 39 hydrogen fueling stations open and available to the public for refueling as of December 2018 (Sources: California Fuel Cell Partnership (CAFCP) and the US Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC)). Interestingly, there were also 39 stations open in January of 2018, so the net change in hydrogen fueling stations over the past 11 months was 0. Also, all of the stations are in California, so there’s a major geographic limitation to the hydrogen refueling network as it stands today.

As an owner, hydrogen is incredibly limiting, but EVs have orders of magnitude more locations to charge. Over 2,000 fast-charging locations (each with capacity for several cars) exist in the US alone for any EV to use; Tesla has around 600 additional locations (again, each with capacity for several cars). To visualize how stark of a difference this is, here’s a map from the AFDC of hydrogen fueling stations in the continental US:

And here are the fast-charging locations in the continental US (again, map from the AFDC):

Electric vehicles run on electricity, and electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure exists worldwide. Even if you don’t live in an area with a fast charger nearby, you can still charge an EV overnight at your home using a regular wall outlet. The massive infrastructure advantage that EVs currently enjoy is a huge factor in why FCEV adoption has been so slow.

Data on the number of FCEVs sold is relatively hard to find, but nothing looks promising. The US FCEV count is 5,658 as of December 2018 according to the CAFCP. We know that the Toyota Mirai didn’t hit 3,000 sales in the US until January 2018 thanks to MotorTrend and TheDrive. Internationally, the picture isn’t any rosier.

Economics

Compounding today’s poor infrastructure are today’s poor economics. When it comes to fueling, hydrogen is more expensive than both gasoline and electricity. Today, refueling an FCEV costs roughly $70: $14 per kilogram times the 5 or so kilograms the tank can store. That tank will take you around 350 miles, which means that the fuel cost per mile is about $0.20. By comparison, hybrids (e.g. Honda Insight, Toyota Prius, Hyundai Ioniq) and electric vehicles (e.g. Teslas and the Chevy Bolt) have fuel costs around $0.05 per mile. Just for fun, I also found the fuel costs for a Ford Raptor ($0.15 per mile), a Toyota Land Cruiser ($0.16 per mile), and a Lamborghini Huracan ($0.19 per mile).

None of this affects the end user, for now. Manufacturers have shouldered the cost of hydrogen fuel during the leasing periods for owners, so the true cost of owning and operating an FCEV hasn’t yet fully affected purchasing decisions. But unless the cost for hydrogen declines heavily over time, consumers would probably just stick to hybrids/EVs for more environmentally-friendly commuting.

There’s a lot of detail that I’m glancing over – how exactly the cost of hydrogen breaks down into production, transmission, and storage; the different methods for each and their associated economics; and how those costs are expected to decrease in the future. I might cover that in a later post, but nothing really changes hydrogen’s competitiveness.

Parallel Industries

So the economics of hydrogen aren’t favorable compared to the economics of electricity (or gasoline, for that matter) today. Moving forward, I think that this lead will continue, but Ali Izadi-Najafabadi says it best:

“Unlike lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles, there is no existing parallel industry for fuel cells that accelerates the speed of cost reduction.”

Some history: Elon Musk became convinced of the technological feasibility of a modern EV from a company named AC Propulsion. That company realized that 18650 battery cells had steadily improved over time, and that if you combined thousands of those battery cells into one larger pack, you could build a high-capacity battery relatively easily. But the improvement of the 18650 cell wasn’t being driven by automotive companies, it was improved upon by laptop manufacturers. The consumer electronics, energy storage, and EV industries all benefit from advances in battery technology, and these industries have some deep pockets. The companies benefitting from hydrogen that put R&D dollars towards fuel cells don’t have the same budgets as the consumer electronics giants like Apple, Samsung, and Lenovo. R&D towards batteries will probably be higher than R&D towards hydrogen, and while that doesn’t guarantee anything in the future, it does favor the batteries.

Hydrogen’s Advantages

Hydrogen’s obvious advantage over batteries is refueling/recharging times. Charging up a battery takes roughly an hour; fueling a tank of hydrogen takes minutes. With passenger vehicles, this doesn’t matter too much, since overnight charging is usually possible. However, when assets (cars, forklifts, planes, trucks) have 100% utilization, the time required to charge a battery may cut into revenue-generating activities. In these situations (e.g. autonomous delivery truck, autonomous taxis, etc.), the cost differential between hydrogen and electricity just needs to be lower than the revenue gain for hydrogen to win out, assuming that battery swaps are infeasible (the capital expenditures required to purchase a second battery, for example, may make this financially the case).

Hydrogen’s other key advantage is energy density, whether by weight or volume. I can think of two places where weight and space matter a lot: shipping and aviation. For planes, lowering weight is key to reducing fuel costs, and you don’t have the space necessary for massive batteries. With maritime shipping, again, batteries take up space and weight that could be occupied by revenue-generating cargo. Furthermore, in both of these industries asset utilization is critical. If battery pack swaps end up as infeasible for planes and ships (perhaps due to difficulty accessing the battery), then fueling up a plane with hydrogen would be an order of magnitude faster than charging a battery.

Conclusion

Hindered by poor infrastructure and economics, FCEVs aren’t as compelling as BEVs when it comes to clean transportation. Still, hydrogen’s advantages in refueling speed and energy density may give it an advantage in certain industries as autonomy increases asset utilization.